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Note
GRAVES v. STATE: UNDERMINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT:
ALLOWING SEXUALLY VIOLENT REPEAT OFFENDERS TO
AVOID ENHANCED REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS UNDER
MARYLAND'S REGISTRATION OF OFFENDERS STATUTE
In Graves v. State,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland considered
whether an out-of-state conviction for a sexually violent offense may
be used to establish an individual as a "sexually violent predator"
under Maryland's Registration of Offenders statute.2 The court held
that the defendant, Garnell Graves, could not be classified as a sexu-
ally violent predator based upon his prior extraterritorial conviction
for an indecent act on a minor.3 The court so reasoned because the
statutory definition of a "sexually violent predator" does not cover in-
dividuals who have been convicted of a sexual offense committed in
another state, even one that would constitute a sexually violent of-
fense if committed in Maryland.4 The court reached its misguided
decision by determining that the statutory definition was subject to a
narrow, plain-meaning interpretation due to a lack of ambiguity in the
statute's language.5 While the court's decision was not clearly errone-
ous, it suffers from a short-sighted analysis and misguided application
of general precepts of statutory interpretation. Accordingly, the
court, in narrowly interpreting the statute, undermined the primary
purpose of its enactment-a "broad and sweeping registration of sex-
ual offenders."6 Consequently, the court created a dangerous prece-
dent by compromising the legitimate purpose behind a crucial
criminal statute.
1. 364 Md. 329, 772 A.2d 1225 (2001).
2. Id. at 331, 772 A.2d at 1226; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792 (Supp. 2000).
Article 27, section 792(a) (12) defines "sexually violent predator" as "an individual who: (i)
Is convicted of a second or subsequent sexually violent offense; and (ii) Has been deter-
mined in accordance with this section to be at risk of committing a subsequent sexually
violent offense."
3. See Graves, 364 Md. at 331, 772 A.2d at 1226.
4. Id.
5. See id. at 346, 772 A.2d at 1235.
6. Graves v. State, 133 Md. App. 97, 114, 754 A.2d 493, 503 (2000).
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I. THE CASE
In October 1991, Garnell Graves was arrested in the District of
Columbia and charged with carnal knowledge and indecent acts on a
minor. 7 The victim was his ten-year-old daughter, who reported that
Graves had entered her bedroom over several nights and held his
hand over her mouth while he engaged in vaginal intercourse with
her.' In 1992, Graves was sentenced to a prison term of two to six
years in Washington, D.C., but was paroled after four years.9
While on parole, Graves moved to Suitland, Maryland, where he
lived in an apartment with Leslie Horton and her eight-year-old sister,
Brittany R.1 ° Shortly thereafter, Brittany reported that Graves had
forced her to have vaginal intercourse with him on approximately
eighteen occasions."1 Graves was indicted for child abuse, second-de-
gree rape in violation of Article 27, section 463, and a third-degree
sexual offense in violation of section 464B. 12 In June 1998, prior to
sentencing, the State filed a notice of intent to request that the trial
court determine whether Graves was a sexually violent predator pursu-
ant to Article 27, section 792(b) (4) of the Maryland Annotated Code
due to his 1992 conviction.13 The trial court held that Graves's prior
conviction could be used as a predicate offense in considering him a
sexually violent predator under Maryland law, thus permitting the
court to impose a ten-year sentence. 14 Graves appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's holding and up-
7. Graves, 364 Md. at 332, 772 A.2d at 1227.
8. Id.; see also Graves, 133 Md. App. at 102, 754 A.2d at 496.
9. Graves, 364 Md. at 332, 772 A.2d at 1227.
10. Id. at 332-33, 772 A.2d at 1227.
11. Id. at 333, 772 A.2d at 1227.
12. Id., 772 A.2d at 1227-28; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 463, 464B (1996). Sec-
tion 463 provides in relevant parts: "A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the
person engaged in vaginal intercourse with another person ... who is under 14 years of
age and the person performing the act is at least four years older than the victim .... " MD.
ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(a)(3). Section 464B provides in relevant parts: "A person is guilty
of a sexual offense in the third degree if the person engages in: (1) sexual contact with
another person against the will and without the consent of the other person, and ...
[i]nflicts suffocation . . . or serious physical injury upon the other person .... " Id.
§ 464B(a) (1) (ii).
13. Graves, 364 Md. at 334, 772 A.2d at 1228.
14. Id. at 335, 772 A.2d at 1229. The trial court judge stated:
I believe that your client under the charge of indecent acts to a minor in the
District of Columbia would-the equivalent charge in this case would be in fact
464(b). So, I believe he has in fact committed a subsequent offense and is in fact
comes [sic] under the definition. And I find him in fact to be a sexually violent
predator under the statute.
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held the contested ten-year sentence.' 5 Even though the court recog-
nized the lack of reference to extraterritorial convictions in the
statute's definition of sexually violent predator, it stated, "we decline
to read the statute as prohibiting a sentencing court from considering
out-of-state convictions when it determines if an individual is a sexu-
ally violent predator."16 Despite the absence of language in the stat-
ute referring to extraterritorial convictions, the court acknowledged
that the legislature intended "broad and sweeping" registration re-
quirements for sex offenders.' 7 The court further explained that sex-
ually violent predators are essentially "sexually violent offender[s]"
who have repeated the offense.18 In affirming the lower court's deci-
sion, the Court of Special Appeals condemned the heinous nature of
the offense of preying on small children and echoed the declaration
of the trial judge that Graves had been sentenced within the recom-
mended guidelines.' 9
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether an
out-of-state conviction for a sexual offense constitutes a prior "sexually
violent offense" for the purposes of classifying an individual as a sexu-
ally violent predator pursuant to Article 27, section 792 of the Mary-
land Code. 20
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In order to provide a context for considering the issue of whether
an out-of-state conviction of a sexually violent offense may be used to
determine whether a defendant qualifies as a "sexually violent
predator" under Maryland law, it is important to examine the origin
of Maryland's sexual offender registration statute, Maryland's treat-
ment of extraterritorial offenses generally, and some basic canons of
statutory interpretation.
15. Graves v. State, 133 Md. App. 97, 115, 754 A.2d 493, 503 (2000).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 114, 754 A.2d at 503.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 103-04, 754 A.2d at 496-97. The trial judge justified his sentencing of Graves
due to his "[I]ack of remorse.., explained by [his) maintaining of [his] innocence, repeat
of similar offense, and ... strong likelihood of repeated offenses." Id. at 104, 754 A.2d at
497.
20. Graves, 364 Md. at 331, 772 A.2d at 1226.
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A. Megan's Law and the Origin of Maryland's Sexual Offender
Registration Statute
Maryland's Sexual Offender Registration laws were formed in re-
sponse to the high risk of recidivism and danger that sex offenders
pose to society.21 Child sex offenders pose a particularly grave threat
because their victims are even less capable of protecting themselves. 2
2
The Maryland General Assembly first passed legislation in 1995
requiring child sex offenders to register with local law enforcement.
23
Since that time, the General Assembly has modified its legislation and
requirements relating to child sexual offenders in response to both
public safety concerns and federal pecuniary incentives.
24
Several states were motivated to implement sex offender registra-
lion and notification laws in response to public alarm from specific,
appalling, publicized incidents involving sexual crimes committed by
prior sex offenders. 21 One of the earliest sex offender registration
statutes was enacted in response to public outrage following the brutal
rape and murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka by convicted sex of-
fender Jesse Timmendequas, who lived across the street from Megan
in New Jersey.2" After Timmendequas's conviction, and in response
to the public reaction to the circumstances surrounding Megan's mur-
der, NewJersey enacted sex offender registration laws, which required
sex offenders to register with local law enforcement and mandated
21. See FLOOR REPORT, S.B. 79, 1995 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1995) ("This bill is
motivated by the belief that persons who commit sexual crimes against children . . . are
similar in their commitment to deviant behavior.").
22. See MD. CHIEFS OF POLICE ASS'N LEGISLATIVE COMM. SUPPORT STATEMENT, S.B. 605,
1997 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997) ("Individuals who commit sex offenses inflict
irreparable, physical, emotional, and psychological trauma upon their victims.").
23. See generally Gregory G. Gillette, Note, Mayland's Child Sexual Offender Notification
and Registration Law, 55 MD. L. REv. 847 (1996) (discussing the legislative history behind
Marvlal's Megan's L.aw).
24. See Graves, 364 Md. at 338, 772 A.2d at 1231; see also 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (f) (2) (A)
(SIpp. V 1999) (providing that any state ftiling to implement legislation for registration of
offenders in compliance with the federal Standards prior to September 1997 would be-
come ineligible for 10% of federal funding that would otherwise be allocated to the states).
25. See also Gillette, supra note 23, at 848-50 (illustrating how incidents in New Jersey,
Washington, and California prompted states to implement regisralion of oflenders
legislation).
26. State v. Timmendequas, 737 A.2d 55, 66-70 (N.J. 1999). Congress reacted to this
tragedy by re-examining existing sex offender registration statutes and consequently
amended the Wetterling Act, which was renamed Megan's Law, mandating states to ex-
pand their statutes to require the disclosure of sex offender registrant information as nec-
essary to protect the public. 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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public notification in certain cases.27 Several states followed suit by
enacting their own versions of Megan's Law.28
Congress similarly responded by enacting a federal version of
Megan's Law, entitled the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children
and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Program (the Wetterling
Act) .29 The Wetterling Act was drafted primarily to protect the public
from violent sex offenses committed by previous offenders by requir-
ing that law enforcement be informed of their presence within the
community. 30
The Wetterling Act requires that "[a] person who is convicted of
a criminal offense against a victim who is a minor or who is convicted
of a sexually violent offense to register" with a designated state law
enforcement agency for ten years after release. 31 These two funda-
mental components of the Wetterling Act apply to two distinct catego-
ries of sex offenders-"sexually violent offenders" and "sexually
violent predators." Heightened registration frequency and notifica-
tion requirements apply to those classified as "sexually violent
predators. "32
Both a specific incident involving a child victim and federal in-
centives motivated the enactment of Maryland's Registration of Of-
fenders Law.33 In 1993, a young child from Dundalk, Maryland
became the victim of sexual assault by a nineteen-year-old neighbor.34
Thirteen months after being convicted and sentenced to serve a six-
year jail sentence, the convicted child sex offender was released and
returned to the victim's neighborhood, unbeknownst to the victim or
his parents. 5 When the parents became aware of the offender's re-
turn to their neighborhood without their prior warning, they were in-
27. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-1 to 7-11 ('Nest 1995).
28. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.130 (West 2000); CAL. PENAL CODE § 290
(West 1999).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 14071. President Clinton approved the Wetterling Act as part of the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act on September 13, 1994. Caroline Louise
Lewis, The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act:
An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due Process, 31 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 89, 94 (1996).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
31. Id. § 14071(a)(1)(A), (b)(6)(A).
32. Id. § 14071 (b) (6) (b) (iii); see also Lewis, supra note 29, at 94-95.
33. See Gillette, supra note 23, at 852.
34. Letter from Anthony Taylor to Maryland Senate Judiciary Committee (on file with
the Maryland Legislative Services Library); see also Gillette, supra note 23, at 852 (discussing
the 1993 incident in Maryland that instigated public outcry demanding registration of of-
fender legislation).
35. See Letter from Anthony Taylor, supra note 34.
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censed.16 They lobbied Maryland Senator Norman Stone, asking that
he introduce a sexual offender registration and notification law in Ma-
ryland.3 7 Ultimately, the Maryland Registration of Offenders law was
promulgated as a result of Senator Stone's proposal."8
In addition to the public outrage following this specific incident,
the Maryland General Assembly was influenced by the Wetterling
Act's compliance incentives. 9 Accordingly, in January 1995, both the
Maryland Senate and House introduced bills following the federal ex-
ample.4 ° Senate Bill 79 required child sex offenders to register with
the local law enforcement agency for ten years.41 The Bill also re-
quired notification of the offender's release from prison by the local
law enforcement agency to the local school superintendent and com-
munity organizations as necessary to protect the public welfare.42 Fi-
nally, Senate Bill 79 required the offender to send personal
information about himself and the crime committed along with a re-
cent photograph to neighbors.43 The Senate approved Senate Bill
79.44 House Bill 230 resembled Senate Bill 79; however, it did not
require the offender to notify the public, instead leaving public notifi-
cation to the discretion of local law enforcement. 45
In the House-Senate Conference Committee, the legislators
crafted a "compromise measure" that resulted in a statute with two
main requirements: (1) child sex offender registration, and (2) lim-
ited public notification.4 6 The Act also required sexual offenders, fol-
lowing their release from prison, to notify local law enforcement of
36. Id
37. See id.; see also Gillette, supra note 23, at 852.
38. See Gillette, supra note 23, at 853-54.
39. The Wetterling Act encouraged each state to enact registration and notification
laws that comported with the federal guidelines by September 1997. 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071 (f) (1) (1994). States failing to comply with the federal program within the allotted
time did not receive up to 10% of federal funding for which they would otherwise be
eligible under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071 (g) (2) (A) (Supp. V 1999).
40. S.B. 79, 1995 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1995); H.B. 239, 1995 Gen. Assem., Reg.
Sess. (Md. 1995); see also Gillette, supra note 23, at 853-54.
41. S.B. 79, 1995 Reg. Sess.; see also Gillette, supra note 23, at 853 (summarizing some of
the registration requirements proposed in Senate Bill 79).
42. S.B. 79, 1995 Reg. Sess.; see also Gillette, supra note 23, at 853.
43. S.B. 79, 1995 Reg. Sess.
44. Gillette, supra note 23, at 853.
45. Id. at 854.
46. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792(c), (g) (Supp. 2000); see also Gillette, supra note 23, at
854 ("The committee agreed that the offender would be required to notify the police, and
that the police could notify certain community organizations as they determined necessary
for public safety.").
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their intention to live within the county."7 The statute defined "child
sexual offender" as someone who "[h]as been convicted in another
state... of an offense that, if committed in this State, would constitute
one of the offenses listed [herein] ."48
In 1997, the General Assembly expanded the 1995 statute to com-
ply with the 1996 amendments to the Wetterling Act."9 The 1997 ver-
sion of Article 27, section 792 of Maryland's Annotated Code
originated as Senate Bill 605 and introduced additional classifications
of offenders and respective registration requirements. 5 ° Senate Bill
605, in its original form, included extraterritorial language in its defi-
nitions of "sexually violent offense" and "sexually violent predator."'"
Specifically, Senate Bill 605 defined "sexually violent predator" to in-
clude a person who "[h]as been convicted in another state of an of-
fense that, if committed in this state, would constitute a sexually
violent offense."5 2 Similarly, the definition of a "sexually violent of-
fense" included "[a] n offense in another state that, if committed in
this state, would constitute a [qualifying] violation."5" Following its
introduction, the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee made pro-
posals for eight amendments to the bill.5 ' None of the proposed
amendments contemplated the removal of the out-of-state conviction
provision from either definition.5 5 Nevertheless, the enacted version
of Senate Bill 605 reflected a significant change in the definitions of
"sexually violent offense" and "sexually violent predator"-the revised
definitions were without their prior reference to extraterritorial of-
fenses.56 However, the enacted statute maintained its reference to ex-
traterritorial offenses in the definition of "sexually violent offender."
57
B. Maryland's Treatment of Extraterritorial Offenses and Treatment by
Other States
A second source of information to consider in resolving whether
an extraterritorial conviction of a sexually violent offense can serve as
a predicate for classifying a defendant as a sexually violent predator is
47. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 7 92(c).
48. Id. § 792(a)(2)(iv).
49. Graves, 364 Md. at 338, 772 A.2d at 1231.
50. S.B. 605, 1997 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. FLOOR REPORT, S.B. 605, 1997 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997).
55. Id.
56. See MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 792(a)(11)-(12) (Supp. 2000).
57. Id. § 792(a) (10) (iii).
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courts' analysis of statutory language pertaining to extraterritorial of-
fenses as predicates in other criminal areas. The analyses used by
both Maryland courts and the courts in other jurisdictions are
instructive.
1. Maryland.-In 1986, in Muir v. State,5" the Court of Appeals
of Maryland considered whether the violent offenses that the defen-
dant had been convicted of by a United States military court could be
considered as a predicate crime for enhanced sentencing under a Ma-,
ryland sentencing statute.5 9 Muir previously pleaded guilty before a
general court martial on two separate robbery charges.6" He was later
convicted of second-degree rape in the Circuit Court for Anne Arun-
del County.6" In the instant case, Muir was convicted of burglary, at-
tempted first and second-degree sexual offenses, and assault with
intent to disable.62 On appeal, Muir argued that the prior court-mar-
tial robbery convictions could not be considered as predicate offenses
within the meaning of section 643B(c).6
The court rejected Muir's argument, instead deferring to the un-
derlying rationale behind the sentencing statute. 64 The court stated
that "[t]he purpose of § 643B 'is to protect the public from assaults
upon people and injury to property and to deter repeat offenders
from perpetrating other criminal acts of violence under the threat of
an extended period of confinement."65 Despite the absence of any
express language within the statute, the court determined that the
statute must be broadly interpreted to apply to repeat offenders of
violent crimes, irrespective of the system in which they were con-
victed.66 The court recognized that "equivalent convictions in juris-
dictions outside of Maryland of crimes of violence within the ambit of
58. 308 Md. 208, 517 A.2d 1105 (1986).
59. Id. at 211, 517 A.2d at 1106; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B (Supp. 2000).
Section 643B(c) provides, in pertinent part:
[A] ny person who (1) has been convicted on two separate occasions of a crime of
violence where the convictions do not arise from a single incident, and (2) has
served at least one term of confinement in a correctional institution as a result of
a conviction of a crime of violence, shall be sentenced, on being convicted a third
time of a crime of violence, to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but, in
any event, not less than 25 years.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 643B(c).
60. Muir, 308 Md. at 211, 517 A.2d at 1107.
61. Id. at 212, 517 A.2d at 1107.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 214, 517 A.2d at 1108.
65. Id. (quoting Hawkins v. State, 302 Md. 143, 148, 486 A.2d 179, 181 (1985)).
66. Muir, 308 Md. at 214, 517 A.2d at 1108.
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§ 643B (a), may be considered as predicate offenses for purposes of
sentencing under the statute's provisions.
67
In 1985, the Court of Special Appeals delivered a conservative
holding on another issue requiring the contemplation of the legisla-
tive intent behind section 643B. In Dibartolomeo v. State,68 the court
contemplated the application of the enhanced sentencing statute to
the defendant's two convictions, which were obtained in Texas and
Maryland. 69 The defendant had been convicted of sodomy and was
sentenced to two to four years in the Texas Department of Correc-
tions. 70 The court rejected the State's argument that the sodomy of-
fense, if committed in Maryland, would constitute a second-degree
sexual offense, thereby making it a crime of violence under section
643B.71 The court looked to the statute's legislative history to deter-
mine whether the predicate offense of sodomy could be construed as
a crime of violence as defined by section 643B.72
The court found that, at the time of the offense, the statute failed
to list sodomy as a qualifying crime of violence. 73 Despite the court's
recognition that "common knowledge [suggests] that [sodomy] is
often accompanied by force and violence," it refused to interpret the
statute more broadly to include sodomy.7 4 Instead, the court found
that the General Assembly had been given the opportunity to include
sodomy as a third-degree sexual offense, but deliberately chose not to
do so. 75 Thus, because the crime of sodomy did not expressly fall
within the language of the applicable statute, the court refused to ap-
ply the enhanced mandatory sentencing penalty.
76
2. Other Jurisdictions.-Other states have also considered the is-
sue of whether to permit out-of-state convictions to serve as predicate
offenses under repeat offender statutes. For instance, in State v. Wil-
Hams,7 7 the Superior Court of New Jersey considered whether a for-
67. Id.
68. 61 Md. App. 302, 486 A.2d 256 (1985).
69. Id. at 303-04, 486 A.2d at 256-57.
70. Id. at 304, 486 A.2d at 257.
71. Id. at 306, 486 A.2d at 258.
72. Id. at 307-11, 486 A.2d at 258-60.
73. Id. at 312, 486 A.2d at 261.
74. Id. at 310-11, 486 A.2d at 260.
75. Id. at 311-12, 486 A.2d at 260-61.
76. Id. at 312, 486 A.2d at 261. The court insinuated that had the issue presented
involved "[a] comparison of the foreign and domestic offenses and the requirement of
evidence to show that the foreign conviction rested on acts that would establish the domes-
tic offense ... [if it was] a crime of violence as defined by the statute," the outcome may
have been different. Id. at 313, 486 A.2d at 261.
77. 706 A.2d 795 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
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eign conviction may be used to extend sentencing under NewJersey's
repeat offender statute.7 s The New Jersey statute provided that "[a]
conviction in another jurisdiction shall constitute a prior conviction of
a crime if a sentence of imprisonment in excess of six months was
authorized under the law of the other jurisdiction."79 Relying on
cases from other jurisdictions interpreting similar statutory language,
the court chose to interpret the statute broadly to apply to convictions
in foreign jurisdictions.8s
C. Canons of Statutory Interpretation
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has frequently explained that
"the paramount goal of statutory interpretation is to identify and ef-
fectuate the legislative intent underlying the statute(s) at issue."8" In
Jones v. State,82 the court explained that statutory interpretation begins
with "an examination of the language of the statute. If the words of
the statute, construed according to their common and everyday mean-
ing, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, [the
court] will give effect to the statute as it is written." 3 The Jones court
applied the plain meaning doctrine to resolve the question of whether
a sentencing judge could select any one of multiple crimes committed
in a single incident as a predicate crime within the meaning of the
statute.8 4 The court rejected the defendant's contention that the rule
of lenity required the court to interpret the statute in a way that
yielded the least punitive effect.8 5 Instead, the court held that the
rule of lenity did not apply because the statute was not ambiguous;
thus, the statute, as plainly read, provided no reason to deny the
78. Id. at 798.
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-4(c) (West 1995).
80. Williams, 706 A.2d at 798.
81. Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000).
82. 336 Md. 255, 647 A.2d 1204 (1994).
83. Id. at 261, 647 A.2d at 1206-07.
84. Id. at 257-58, 647 A.2d at 1205. The court applied the plain meaning doctrine and
concluded:
We find no merit in Jones' claim of ambiguity: as there exists no ambiguity in the
statute .... Section 643B (c) plainly provides that a third conviction of a crime of
violence mandates the imposition of a minimum twenty-five year penalty....
Thus, there can be no contention that Jones' robbery conviction did not qualify
as a third conviction of a crime of violence.
Id. at 263, 647 A.2d at 1207-08.
85. Id. "[T]he rule of lenity... 'means that the Court will not interpret a... criminal
statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpreta-
tion can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the Legislature] intended."' Id. at
261, 647 A.2d at 1207 (quoting Moniker v. State, 321 Md. 214, 222, 582 A.2d 525, 529
(1990) (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958))).
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judge's sound discretion to select any of the predicate convictions as
the third conviction under the statute.86
In Garnett v. State,8 7 the Court of Appeals was required to look
beyond the plain language of the Maryland statutory rape statute in
order to discern the legislature's intended purpose.88 In particular,
the court contemplated whether, under the statute, the State must
prove that the defendant knew the victim was under the age of four-
teen at the time of the offense.89 Two facts were critical. First, the
perpetrator, Garnett, had an IQ level of 52, which placed him at ap-
proximately the same cognitive level as the thirteen-year-old victim.
Second, the offense was committed at the voluntary invitation of the
victim.9" In considering whether the legislature intended to provide
for a mistake-of-age defense, the court looked to the legislative history
of the statutory rape statute.9 Ultimately, the court concluded that
because "the Legislature explicitly raised, considered, and then explic-
itly jettisoned [the] mens rea element" it intended the statute to serve
as a strict liability law.9 2 Thus, in Garnett, the court viewed the legisla-
ture's failure to include a mens rea element in the language of the
statute as entirely dispositive of its intent.93
More recently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland provided fur-
ther guidance on resolving statutory interpretation issues. In Degren v.
State,94 the court considered the legislative intent behind Article 27,
section 35C to determine whether one responsible for a child who
fails to prevent that child's rape while present may be found guilty of
sexual abuse.95 In examining the legislative intent behind the child
86. Id. at 263, 647 A.2d at 1207-08.
87. 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 (1993).
88. See id. at 585-87, 632 A.2d at 804-05.
89. Id. at 574, 632 A.2d at 798. Article 27, section 463 of the Maryland Annotated Code
states that "[a] person is guilty of rape ... if the person engaged in vaginal intercourse with
another person [w]ho is under 14 years of age and the person performing the act is at least
four years older than the victim." MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463 (1996).
90. Garnett, 332 Md. at 574-75, 632 A.2d at 798-99.
91. Id. at 585-86, 632 A.2d at 804. The court stated that "an examination of the draft-
ing history of § 463 during the 1976 revision of Maryland's sexual offense laws reveals that
the statute was viewed as one of strict liability from its inception and throughout the
amendment process." Id. at 586, 632 A.2d at 804.
92. Id. at 587, 632 A.2d at 805.
93. Id.
94. 352 Md. 400, 722 A.2d 887 (1999).
95. Id. at 404, 722 A.2d at 888. Article 27, section 35C of the Maryland Annotated
Code defines sexual abuse as "any act that involves sexual molestation or exploitation of a
child .... " MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35C(a)(6)(1) (1996). In addition, under the Mary-
land Code, "a parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or
responsibility for the supervision of a child... who causes abuse to the child is guilty of a
felony . . . ." Id, § 35C(b) (1).
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abuse statute, the court stressed the need to look at the "larger con-
text, including the legislative purpose, within which statutory lan-
guage appears."96  Additionally, the court proclaimed that
"[c] onstuction of a statute which is unreasonable, illogical, unjust, or
inconsistent with common sense should be avoided. '9 7 The court re-
viewed the legislative amendments to the statute, which proposed the
adoption of more inclusive language that would have made the defen-
dant's omission fall within the meaning of the statute.9" The defen-
dant argued that because the Legislature failed to enact more
inclusive language, although it had the opportunity to do so, the stat-
ute should be strictly construed.9" In rejecting the defendant's argu-
ment, the court recalled the statute's underlying rationale as declared
by the General Assembly, which was "the protection of children who
have been the subject of abuse." 100 Accordingly, the court overlooked
the plain meaning interpretation of the sexual abuse provision in or-
der to further the underlying purpose of the child abuse statute. 01
Most recently, in In re Anthony R, 10 2 the court again elaborated
on the plain meaning doctrine, explaining that even where the lan-
guage of the statute is clear and unambiguous, statutory language
should be construed with regard to its context and with due consider-
ation to "external manifestations of intent or general purpose availa-
ble through other evidence."' 3 In construing the statute under
consideration, the court further explained that when engaging in stat-
utory interpretation, the court is not confined to the plainly listed
words of the statute; rather, consideration should be given to "other
'external manifestations' or 'persuasive evidence,' including a bill's ti-
tle and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed
through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent leg-
islation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue
of legislative purpose or goal ... ."104
96. Degren, 352 Md. at 417, 722 A.2d at 895 (quoting Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380,
387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992)).
97. Id. (quoting Tracey, 328 Md. at 387, 614 A.2d at 594).
98. Id. at 419-21, 722 A.2d at 896-97.
99. Id. at 420, 722 A.2d at 897.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 420-21, 722 A.2d at 897. In considering the legislative intent and underlying
purpose behind the child abuse statute, the court held that an omission or failure to act
falls within the definition of sexual abuse. Id. at 436, 722 A.2d at 905.
102. 362 Md. 51, 763 A.2d 136 (2000).
103. Id. at 57, 763 A.2d at 140 (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567
A.2d 126, 127 (1989)).
104. Id. at 54, 57-58, 763 A.2d at 140 (quoting Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md.
505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987)).
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III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Graves v. State, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the
Court of Special Appeals, holding that Graves's prior conviction in the
District of Columbia for an indecent act on a minor could not be used
to classify Graves as a sexually violent predator within the plain mean-
ing of Article 27, section 792(a) (11) of the Maryland Code. °5 In the
unanimous opinion written by Judge Battaglia, the Court of Appeals
rejected the State's advocacy for a broad interpretation of the
statute. 6
In reaching its decision, the court first acknowledged the genesis
of the local legislature's enactment of the offender registration stat-
ute. 10 7 In tracing the statute's historical development, the court ex-
plained that the initial Maryland statute, enacted in 1995, defined
"child sexual offender" as "someone who ... [h]as been convicted in
another state of an offense that, if committed in this state, would con-
stitute one of the offenses listed [herein]."108 The court noted that
prior to Graves's conviction, the language of the Maryland offender
registration law had been expanded to create additional offender clas-
sifications.'0° Responding to the 1996 amendments to the Wetterling
Act, in 1997 the General Assembly revised and expanded the provi-
sions of the offender registration statute, creating Article 27, section
792.110
Applying the canons of statutory interpretation, the court recog-
nized that in determining the legislative intent and the meaning of
the controversial terms-sexually violent offense and sexually violent
predator-" [it] must look first to the ordinary and plain meaning of
the words of the statute."' 1 The court also opined that "all parts of a
statute are to be read together to find the intention as to any one part,
and all parts are to be reconciled and harmonized if possible."' 12 Ap-
plying these rules of statutory interpretation, the court first noted the
absence of references to out-of-state convictions in the definition of
105. Graves, 364 Md. at 352, 772 A.2d at 1239.
106. See id. at 351-52, 772 A.2d at 1238-39.
107. Id. at 336, 772 A.2d at 1229-30.
108. Id. at 337-38, 772 A.2d at 1230-31 (quoting MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 692B (1992)).
109. Id. at 338, 772 A.2d at 1231. The 1997 version of section 792 provided definitions
of the classification terms: offender, child sexual offender, sexually violent offense, sexually violent
offender, and sexually violent predator. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792(a) (Supp. 2000).
110. Graves, 364 Md. at 338-42, 772 A.2d at 1231-32.
111. Id. at 346, 772 A.2d at 1235.
112. Id. (quoting Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 596, 380 A.2d 1052, 1055 (1977)).
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sexually violent predator, despite the inclusion of such a reference in
the definition of sexually violent offender.' 13
Notwithstanding the court's disclaimer that ordinarily where the
statutory language is on its face unambiguous there is no need to look
to the legislative history, the court did examine the legislative history
behind the enactment of section 792.'14 In its examination of the leg-
islative history, the court found that when section 792 was first intro-
duced, its definitions of sexually violent predator and sexually violent
offense included a provision allowing a conviction in another state to
serve as a predicate offense." 5 The court concluded that the absence
of an extraterritorial provision from the current definitions was a clear
indication of the General Assembly's "conscious[ ]" and "deliber-
ate[ ]" intent to limit the provision's scope.'16 Thus, the court gave
greater consideration to the statute's plain language and the Legisla-
ture's "deliberate" failure to include the out-of-state provision of Sen-
ate Bill 605 in the final statute.' 7 As a result, the court decided that
Graves was not subject to the enhanced registration requirements of
section 792(d) (4).1"8
IV. ANALYSIS
The court's decision in Graves, although not clearly erroneous,
created a dangerous precedent because the court interpreted a crimi-
nal statute based upon a single legislative act, thus yielding a result
that defeats the obvious purpose and rationale behind the statute.
Moreover, the court's outcome is inappropriate in light of prior case
law, which permits the court to reject interpretations that are contrary
113. Id., 772 A.2d at 1235-36.
114. Id, at 346-50, 772 A.2d at 1236-37. The court considered Senate Bill 605, the prede-
cessor to the 1997 statute. Id, at 346-50, 772 A.2d at 1236-38.
115. Id. at 347, 772 A.2d at 1236. Senate Bill 605 § 792 (A) (7) (I) (5) defined a "sexually
violent predator" as a person who "[ h ] as been convicted in another state of an offense that,
if committed in this state, would constitute a sexually violent offense .... " Furthermore,
the court recognized that both the Bill Analysis and the Floor Report for Senate Bill 605
defined the terms sexually violent offender and sexually violent predator by reference to
sexually violent offenses committed within Maryland and in other jurisdictions. Id. at 348,
772 A.2d at 1236-37.
116. Id. at 350, 772 A.2d at 1238.
117. Id. at 351-52, 772 A.2d at 1238-39. In rejecting the State's argument, the court
stated, "[w]e decline to read into § 792(a)(11) the ability to base a pcrson's status as a
sexually violent predator on convictions or guilty pleas occurring and charged in other
jurisdictions." Id at 352, 772 A.2d at 1239.
118. Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, § 792(d)(4) (Supp. 2000) (stating in pertinent
part, "[a] sexually violent predator shall register every 90 days").
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to common sense, particularly when evidence exists to warrant a more
sound interpretation.119
A. Undermining Statutory Purpose By Failing to Consider Legislative
Intent and Structure
Courts are rarely faulted for making decisions based upon narrow
interpretations of penal statutes.1 20 However, when courts' interpreta-
tions entirely disregard the intended purpose of the legislation, it is
prudent to consider a more commonsensical construction. z1 2  Despite
the Graves court's recognition of the clear intent behind enhanced
registration requirements for sexually violent predators, the court ulti-
mately failed to construe the statute in accord with the statute's gen-
eral purpose of protecting society from the threat posed by repeat
sexually violent offenders.1 22 Instead, the court unwisely decided to
give greater weight to Graves's argument that the plain meaning of
sexually violent predator, as defined in the statute, excluded his prior
extraterritorial conviction from consideration under section 792.123
The court examined the plain language of the statute as the pre-
liminary step in construing the legislative intent. 124 The court's rea-
soning later became attenuated and misguided. When reviewing the
definition of sexually violent predator, the court concluded that the
lack of reference to out-of-state convictions "yields the conclusion that
the legislature specifically excluded reference to [such] convictions
from the realm of criminal conduct to be taken into account in deter-
mining whether someone qualifies as a sexually violent
119. See In re Anthony R., 362 Md. 51, 57, 763 A.2d 136, 140 (2000) (explaining that
even when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it is necessary to read the lan-
guage in the context in which its appears); see also Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417-18,
722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999). The Degren court explained that when interpreting a statute, it is
necessary to look at the entire context, especially the purpose behind the statute. I&. at
417, 722 A.2d at 895. Moreover, the court noted that interpretations that are illogical and
inconsistent with common sense must be avoided. Id. at 418, 722 A.2d at 895.
120. See United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22 (1952)
("[WIhen choice has to be made between two readings of what Congress has made a
crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress
should have spoken in language that is clear .... We should not derive criminal outlawry
from some ambiguous implication.").
121. See, e.g., Degren, 352 Md. at 420, 722 A.2d at 897 (rejecting a strict plain meaning
interpretation of Maryland's child abuse statute in favor of an alternative interpretation
that comported with "common-sense, logic, and the purpose and goals of the child abuse
statute and its amendments").
122. See Graves, 364 Md. at 336 n.8, 772 A.2d at 1229 n.8 (discussing the impetus for the
Maryland statute as springing from federal legislation developed to address crimes of vio-
lence committed against children).
123. Id. at 345, 352, 772 A.2d at 1235, 1239.
124. Id. at 346, 772 A.2d at 1235.
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predator .... ,,125 The court's first error occurred in its cursory con-
clusion that no ambiguity exists within the sexually violent predator
definition. 126 Only by viewing the definition in a vacuum could such a
deduction result.
The State's contention that the statute's construction of sexually
violent predator was unambiguous deserved further examination due
to the presence of the extraterritorial provision in the definition of
sexually violent offender.1 27 Because a sexually violent predator is es-
sentially a repeat sexually violent offender,1 28 it follows that the incon-
sistency between these two definitions creates a genuine ambiguity.' 29
Indeed, the court stated that when determining legislative intent, "all
parts of a statute are to be read together to find the intention as to any
one part, and all parts are to be reconciled and harmonized if possi-
ble."1 ' Consequently, the court should have resolved the ambiguity
by recognizing that because the sexually violent offender category in-
cludes consideration of out-of-state convictions, and a sexually violent
predator is a sexually violent offender who has committed a subse-
quent offense, the elemental characteristics of the offender classifica-
tion also apply to the predator classification.' 31
The court committed its second error when it undertook a simi-
larly narrow examination of related parts within the statute by failing
to acknowledge certain definitional and structural implications.1 32
The court failed to consider the inconsistent effect of permitting the
use of extraterritorial convictions for classifying sexually violent of-
fenders, while simultaneously disallowing the use of extraterritorial
125. Id.
126. See id. at 346-47, 772 A.2d at 1236 (reaching this conclusion by stating the rule that
where language is clear and unambiguous, the court need look no further than the plain
meaning of the statute).
127. See id. at 345, 772 A.2d at 1235 (providing the State's contention that despite the
exclusion of specific language referring to commission of crimes in other states, the pres-
ence of the extraterritorial provisions in other parts of the statute deserved consideration);
see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792(a) (2) (iv) (Supp. 2000) (defining a "child sexual of-
fender" as a person who "[h]as been convicted in another state ... of an offense that, if
committed in this State, would constitute one of the offenses listed [herein]").
128. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792(1)(12).
129. Graves v. State, 133 Md. App. 97, 115, 754 A.2d 493, 503 (2000) (interpreting the
same statutory language and reaching a conclusion opposite the conclusion reached by the
Court of Appeals).
130. Graves, 364 Md. at 346, 772 A.2d at 1236 (quoting Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593,
596, 380 A.2d 1052, 1055 (1977)).
131. Brief of Respondent at 10-11, Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 772 A.2d 1225 (2001)
(No. 84).
132. See Graves, 364 Md. at 340-42, 772 A.2d at 1232-33 (acknowledging the inconsistent
references to extraterritorial offenses throughout the statute and failing to address the
alternative implications of these inconsistencies).
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convictions when classifying sexually violent predators. The court's
interpretation is particularly illogical because sexually violent
predators pose a far greater risk to society.133 Instead of considering
the probable implication of the extraterritorial provision within the
sexually violent offense and predator definitions, the court claimed
that the legislature specifically excluded reference to out-of-state con-
victions in these definitions.1 3 4 In order to justify its rejection of the
State's argument that the General Assembly did not intend to exclude
repeat sex offenders from the definition of sexually violent predator
simply because they were convicted of the crimes in outside jurisdic-
tions, the court examined the legislative history behind the predeces-
sor to section 792-Senate Bill 605-to determine the purpose and
aim behind enacting the legislation.1 3 5
The court's analysis of the legislature's policy aims and the
court's subsequent statutory interpretation, however, did not further
the statute's purpose.1 3 6 Indeed, the court's conclusion is flawed
given the legislative history of section 792. In its examination of Sen-
ate Bill 605, the court noted the presence of the extraterritorial provi-
sion in the definition of sexually violent predator in both the Bill
Analysis and the Floor Report. 137 The court traced the Legislature's
consideration of the bill and determined that the absence, in section
792, of the out-of-state provision within the definitions of sexually vio-
lent offense and sexually violent predator meant that the General As-
sembly "consciously" and "deliberately" intended its removal. 38 The
conclusion is particularly attenuated because not one of the eight pro-
posed amendments to Senate Bill 605 suggested the removal of the
out-of-state convictions provision.139 Due to the absence of any propo-
sal to remove the provision from the bill, the court's conclusion that
its absence from the enacted statute was "deliberate" is questiona-
133. See ANN WOLBERT BURGESS ET AL., CIULD TRAUMiA 1: ISSUES AND RESEARCH 443
(1992).
134. Graves, 364 Md. at 346, 772 A.2d at 1235. The court stated that an analysis of the
language by the General Assembly "yields the conclusion that the legislature specifically
excluded reference to out-of-state convictions from the realm of criminal conduct to be
taken into account in determining whether someone qualifies as a sexually violent
predator .... Id.
135. Id. at 346-51, 772 A.2d at 1236-38.
136. See id. at 352, 772 A.2d at 1238 (stating the court's decision to construe the statu-
tory language narrowly without due regard to legislative history and intent).
137. Id. at 348-49, 772 A.2d at 1237.
138. Id. at 350, 772 A.2d at 1238.
139. See FLOOR REPORT, S.B. 605, 1997 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1997) (containing
the Senate Judicial Proceeding Committee's amendments to Senate Bill 605); see also
Graves, 364 Md. at 349, 772 A.2d at 1237.
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ble. 4 ° Instead, given the ambiguity surrounding the provision's re-
moval, the court should have contemplated the possibility that the
extraterritorial provision included in the sexually violent offender def-
inition was intended to be inferred in the sexually violent offense and
sexually violent predator definitions.
B. Prior Case Law Offers Interpretive Latitude
The court's decision in Graves, while not inconsistent with prior
case law, was not mandated by the court's previous approach in statu-
tory interpretation cases. Despite the court's propensity for relying on
a statute's plain meaning, other cases suggest that the statute's pur-
pose is equally relevant.' 4 ' The Graves court failed to reconcile its de-
cision with the decision in Degren v. State, which held that despite the
narrow conclusion yielded by the plain meaning of the statute's sexual
abuse provision, the statute should be construed broadly to include
omissions in accord with the statute's underlying purpose.'4 2 Thus,
the Degren court's willingness to broadly interpret the statute by giving
deference to the public policy behind the statute, despite the statute's
plain meaning, would have provided the Graves court with support for
an alternative outcome.
Given the similarities in the purpose behind the statutes in ques-
tion in Graves and Degren, the Graves court would have been justified in
following the Degren court's approach. The underlying rationale be-
hind the child abuse statute in Degren was "the protection of children
who have been the subject of abuse . ,,.4."'4 This purpose bears a
strong similarity to the purpose of Maryland's registration of sexual
offenders statute-to protect children from being subjected to violent
sexual crimes at the hands of offenders who have a high likelihood for
recidivism.' 44 In Degren, the defendant argued that because the Gen-
eral Assembly had the opportunity to expand the statute's definition
of "sexual abuse" to expressly include an act or omission, failure to
140. Graves, 364 Md. at 351, 772 A.2d at 1238.
141. See Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 417-18, 722 A.2d 887, 895 (1999) (explaining the
court's obligation to construe the statutory language at issue in accordance with external
manifestation of the legislature's intent, as opposed to limiting its construction to the plain
language); Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 584-87, 632 A.2d 797, 803-05 (1993) (construing
the statutory language under consideration in accord with its plain language because that
interpretation would comport with the legislative purpose behind the statute); State v.
Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421, 348 A.2d 275, 278 (1975) (stating that statutes should be reason-
ably interpreted according to the legislature's purpose in drafting the legislation).
142. Degren, 352 Md. at 428, 722 A.2d at 900.
143. Id. at 413, 722 A.2d at 893 (quoting Fabritz, 276 Md. at 423, 348 A.2d at 279).
144. FLOOR REPORT, S.B. 79, 1995 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1995).
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broaden the definition clearly manifested "[its] intent to limit what
constitutes sexual abuse to affirmative deeds." '45 The court ultimately
rejected the defendant's interpretation, reasoning that to limit the
provision's scope to affirmative acts "defies common sense, logic, and
the purpose and goals of the child abuse statute . "..."146
Accordingly, the Degren court, by interpreting the statute broadly
to include an omission to act despite the absence of express words,
provided justification for an alternative outcome in Graves. Because
Graves presented an issue of first impression for the Maryland courts,
the analysis provided in Degren offers valuable guidance on how to re-
solve issues of statutory interpretation where the plain meaning of a
statute is inconsistent with its underlying purpose.147 However, the
Graves court chose to give greater weight to the legislature's failure to
explicitly include the extraterritorial provision in the sexually violent
predator definition, thus ignoring both the clear purpose behind the
statute and the precedent set by Degren
1 4 s
Although the court's strict interpretation of a statute based upon
the absence of a mens rea element within the statutory language in
Garnett v. State appears to substantiate the court's plain meaning argu-
ment in Graves, the analogy ends there. 14' The court in Garnett found
dispositive the traditional view of statutory rape as "a strict liability
crime designed to protect young persons from the dangers of sexual
exploitation by adults, loss of chastity, physical injury, and in the case
of girls, pregnancy." ' Thus, the court's holding in Garnett was sup-
ported by both the plain meaning of the statute and the fundamental
purpose behind the statute's enactment. 51 In contrast, the Graves
court's plain meaning interpretation devalues the underlying ratio-
nale of the statute.
As illustrated, in prior cases the court has interpreted statutes by
looking to both broad and specific legislative intent. The court has
145. Degren, 352 Md. at 420, 722 A.2d at 897.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 424-28, 722 A.2d at 899-900.
148. Graves, 364 Md. at 351-52, 772 A.2d at 1238-39.
149. Garnett v. State, 332 Md. 571, 587, 632 A.2d 797, 805 (1993). In Garnett, the Court
of Appeals considered whether Maryland's statutory rape law required the State to prove
that the defendant knew that the victim was younger than fourteen years of age. Id. at 574,
632 A.2d at 798. The State favored a strict plain meaning interpretation because the stat-
ute provided no reference to a culpability requirement. Id. at 576-77, 632 A.2d at 799-800.
The court held, based on the "plain language of § 463, viewed in its entirety, and the
legislative history of its creation," that the statute is a strict liability offense that does not
require proof of a mens rea element. Id. at 585, 632 A.2d at 804.
150. Id. at 587, 632 A.2d at 805.
151. See id.
2002]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
generally resolved issues in accord with the fundamental and rational
purpose behind the statute under consideration. As in Garnett v. State,
the court will restrict its interpretation to a statute's unambiguous
plain meaning when the statute's underlying purpose is not compro-
mised in the process. 52 Thus, the Graves court's decision to construe
the statutory language counter to the underlying purpose of the legis-
lation defies prior application of the canons of statutory
interpretation.
C Harmful Implications of the Graves Decision
The court's narrow holding in Graves raises serious concerns re-
garding the future efficacy of Maryland's Registration of Offenders
law by creating the potential for a subset of repeat offenders to avoid
registration requirements within Maryland. The court's holding, de-
termining that only those offenders with a record of previous sexually
violent acts in Maryland are subject to the enhanced registration re-
quirements, limits the degree of protection the state may provide to
its citizens. Like the Wetterling Act, the Maryland statute was enacted
in recognition of the inherent threat that sex offenders pose to soci-
ety, especially children."' 3 Both the federal and Maryland statutes rec-
ognize the various levels of offense that are committed upon children
and give due regard to the prevalence of convicted offenders repeat-
ing violent crimes.154 Accordingly, the Maryland statute reflects sensi-
tivity to the greater threat posed by repeat offenders. Both sexual
offenders and sexually violent offenders must register annually for a
ten-year period, 155 while those classified as sexually violent predators
must register every ninety days for a ten-year period.156 The height-
ened registration requirements imposed upon predators, as com-
pared to offenders, reflects the degree of significance the Maryland
Legislature attributed to the more serious threats created by
predators. It is questionable whether an individual who is subject to
the enhanced predator registration requirement will be less likely to
commit repeat offenses, but at least the public will be given the bene-
fit of local law enforcement awareness of this possibility.1 57 Accord-
ingly, the more likely the offender is to repeat qualifying crimes, the
152. See Garnett, 332 Md. at 587, 632 A.2d at 805.
153. See Lewis, supra note 29, at 92 (describing the rationale behind sex offender laws).
154. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792 (Supp. 2000); 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (Supp. V 1999)
(providing tiered classifications of sexual offender levels).
155. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 792(d) (3).
156. Id. § 792(d) (4).
157. Id.
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more frequent the registration requirement should be imposed.
Therefore, the court's decision not to consider Graves's prior convic-
tion in Washington, D.C. as a predicate offense that would trigger the
predator classification limits the public's ability to protect itself in the
face of a demonstrated recidivist.
Furthermore, the court's holding indicates its refusal to recog-
nize the General Assembly's purpose behind the tiered classification
system. 158 The court's failure to recognize the legislative purpose in
heightened offender classifications essentially immunizes an individ-
ual who had committed ten previous acts of sexual violence upon
young children in other states from being considered a sexually vio-
lent predator. In addition, the court's holding provides an indirect
advantage to criminals with records of prior sexually violent offense
convictions in other states who move to Maryland. The court prevents
facilitation of the Legislature's objective to protect society from recidi-
vism by its narrow holding. Consequently, the court's holding evokes
considerable policy concerns that could have been avoided by a
broader statutory interpretation.
The court, by its narrow interpretation of section 792, forfeited
the opportunity to affirm the more prudent lower court finding that
the legislature clearly intended "a broad and sweeping registration of
sexual offenders.' 1 5 ' The Graves decision suggests that the General
Assembly would find that because Graves lived outside of Maryland
when he committed the crime, he is less likely to present a danger to
the public, or repeat the offense, than he would be if he committed
his initial offense within the state of Maryland. Such a conclusion de-
fies logic. In fact, Graves demonstrated his propensity for recidivism
by committing the subsequent crime against eight-year-old Brittany R.
after being convicted and serving time for indecent acts on a minor in
Washington, D.C.1 6 ° Thus, while the court's holding is permitted by
the canons of statutory interpretation, the court has disregarded the
purpose of the statute by allowing Graves to escape registration and
notification requirements that were designed precisely for repeat of-
fenders like him.
V. CONCLUSION
In Graves v. State, the Court of Appeals misapplied a basic canon
of statutory interpretation by failing to look beyond the plain lan-
158. Graves, 364 Md. at 331, 772 A.2d at 1226.
159. Graves v. State, 133 Md. App. 97, 114, 754 A.2d 493, 503 (2000).
160. Graves, 364 Md. at 333, 772 A.2d at 1227-28.
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guage of the legislation. The Graves court's failure to apply the statu-
tory interpretation analysis from prior cases such as Degren
demonstrates a strict approach to statutory interpretation challenges
that cannot be reconciled with prior decisions, including conservative
decisions such as Garnett. As a result, Graves issues a warning to the
Maryland Legislature that when its legislation is not expressly and ex-
plicitly drafted, there is a likelihood that the court will afford an op-
pressively strict interpretation to any statute that is tested, even if the
statute's purpose is compromised as a result.
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